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Stephen J. Newmant
Courts are used to dealing with words. Lawyers parse sen-
tences, resolve textual ambiguities, create and alleviate tension
in language, and tease meaning out of dense syntax. When faced
with symbols other than words, however, lawyers and courts
frequently forget everything they know. But just as legal minds
can determine what a word is, and is to do, they also can deter-
mine what nonverbal symbols are designed to do, and can apply
that knowledge to bring order to an unsettled area of the law.'
This Comment argues that under certain circumstances, courts
should permit the limited ownership of a particular type of non-
verbal signifier-color-in much the same manner as they permit
the limited ownership of what courts understand best-words.
To say that a person may "own!' a color under trademark law
is somewhat deceptive. When the law declares that a business
owns a trademark, all the law says is that no one else may use
that trademark when marketing goods or services, if use of the
mark would mislead or confuse purchasers as to the true source
of what is marketed. Others can still use the trademarked color
outside the owner's line of business, where the use of the mark
will not deceive customers as to source or sponsorship. Granting
Lanham Act protection to color will not result in corporate trade-
mark cops, conducting raids on artists who use "Widgetco Peach,"
unless the artists are selling widgets. And even if the artists are
selling widgets, they probably may use a protected color as long
as they do not use it in a manner that would suggest an affilia-
tion with Widgetco, or that would confuse purchasers as to the
true source of the widgets.2
t A.B. 1992, Harvard University; J.D. Candidate 1995, The University of Chicago.
' Indeed, the practice of examining nonverbal signifiers has long been recognized as
a vital element of First Amendment jurisprudence. See, for example, Texas v Johnson, 491
US 397, 404 (1989) ("The First Amendment literally forbids the abridgement only of
'speech,' but we have long recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken or
written word.").
2 See Michelin Tire Corp. v General Tire & Rubber Co., 202 USPQ (BNA) 294, 299
(TTAB 1979) (noting that competitors may use trademarked letter, "X," so long as "the
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This Comment argues that trademark law should treat color
as it treats other symbols-be they words, numbers, shapes,
sounds, or scents. In other words, a producer should sometimes
be allowed to claim a distinctive color as his own, and bar others
from using it in a manner that could confuse purchasers. Just as
color can be used for powerful effect in advertising, it can be used
for powerful effect by manufacturers who intend to deceive
purchasers into believing that shoddy goods are in fact the well-
constructed goods of another. Because color can be used to mis-
identify the source of goods, trademark law should protect legiti-
mate use of color, and should allow actions against those who
seek to mislead the public.
A trademark allows a purchaser to identify products with a
certain manufacturer, or with certain qualities that distinguish
the product from other, similar products. Trademarks (or service
marks) usually are words ("Kodak"), phrases ("Burger King"), or
distinctive designs (the "golden arches" at McDonald's). "Trade
dress," the product's overall appearance in the marketplace, also
may be protected.3 Technology and marketing creativity march
on, however, with manufacturers seeking protection of new and
unique symbols to signify products and services.
The Patent and Trademark Office has granted trademark
protection to certain sounds4 and scents.5 Some courts, however,
have been reluctant to read the broad language of the federal
trademark statute, the Lanham Act,6 to protect such nontradi-
tional symbols. In NutraSweet Co. v Stadt Corp., the Seventh
Circuit held that color alone, without the addition of designs,
slogans, or other marketing staples, may never be protected
under the Lanham Act.7 The court held that to protect "mere
color" would upset existing expectations of the scope of the
letter has been so merged or obfuscated in the whole as to create an overall commercial
impact unlike that of the letter mark alone").
' See Two Pesos, Inc. v Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S Ct 2753, 2755 (1992) (protecting a
restaurant's "Mexican trade dress" described, in part, as "a festive eating atmosphere").
' See George Gottlieb, "In Case You Missed It... " 62 Trademark Rptr 605, 605-06
(1972) (noting, along with other sound trademarks, the registration of "a sequence of
chime-like musical notes which in the key of C sound the notes G, E, C"). Even the
musically uninclined are likely to recognize this sequence of notes as identifying the
National Broadcasting Company, Inc. ("NBC").
' See, for example, In re Clarke, 17 USPQ2d (BNA) 1238, 1238-40 (TTAB 1990)
(allowing registration of "a high impact, fresh floral fragrance reminiscent of Plumeria
blossoms" as a mark for sewing thread and embroidery yarn).
' The Trademark Act of 1946, 60 Stat 427, codified as amended at 15 USC §§ 1051-
1127 (1988).
' 917 F2d 1024 (7th Cir 1990).
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Lanham Act, promote monopoly, and plunge the courts into
intractable questions of color confusion.8 The NutraSweet deci-
sion directly conflicts with the decisions of the Eighth Circuit9
and of the Federal Circuit 0 (a specialized court that hears many
trademark cases). Those circuits have held that the Lanham Act
should be read broadly to protect nontraditional signifiers, such
as color sans design or slogan, provided other doctrines of trade-
mark law are satisfied.
This Comment suggests that the Lanham Act does protect
color marks, but that courts should end their abstract approach
to the question of whether color alone may be protected. "Mere
color" should be treated in a manner similar to traditional verbal
signifiers. As with traditional signifiers, courts should apply the
widely accepted classification system suggested by Judge Friend-
ly in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v Hunting World, Inc." to deter-
mine whether a given color is distinctive enough to serve as a
trademark. In addition, courts should recognize that not all colors
are created equal. Courts should examine several factors, includ-
ing aspects of how the color and the product appear in the rele-
vant market; technical considerations, both in creating a particu-
lar color and in applying the color to the product; and the physio-
logical, psychological, and cultural aspects of a color.
Section I introduces the Lanham Act and basic trademark
doctrines, and Section II describes the widely varying views of
federal appellate courts on the question of whether color war-
rants trademark protection. Section III explores the physics,
physiology, and psychology of color, and discusses how protecting
"mere color" trademarks may produce efficiency gains in the form
of reduced consumer search costs. Section IV presents additional
efficiency rationales for granting Lanham Act protection to "mere
color." Finally, Section V discusses how courts may apply the
Abercrombie & Fitch distinctiveness hierarchy to determine
which "mere color" marks should receive protection.
8 Id at 1027-28.
' See Master Distributors, Inc. v Pako Corp., 986 F2d 219 (8th Cir 1993) (rejecting a
per se rule against allowing a manufacturer to trademark the blue color of its "Blue Max
splicing tape).
0 See In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F2d 1116, 1128 (Fed Cir 1985)
(allowing the registration of the color pink as a trademark for fibrous glass insulation).
" 537 F2d 4, 9-11 (2d Cir 1976). Judge Friendly developed a test for determining the
propriety of trademark protection for words. This test categorizes words as (1) generic, (2)
descriptive, (3) suggestive, or (4) arbitrary or fanciful. Generic words are the least dis-
tinctive and hardest to protect; arbitrary or fanciful words are the most distinctive and
easiest to "own."
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I. THE LANHAM ACT
The Lanham Act was designed to prevent unfair competition
and to protect purchasers' expectations of quality. 2 At its heart,
the Act forbids one manufacturer from taking advantage of the
good name of another. A manufacturer may register a mark to
identify its goods in the marketplace and thus distinguish its
goods from those of others."3 One also may register a mark to
describe a service.'4 To ensure the protection of trademarks, the
Act imposes civil liability on a manufacturer who uses unregis-
tered signs and symbols in a manner that would mislead pur-
chasers as to the source, origin, or manufacturer of a product. 5
The language of the Lanham Act places few restrictions on
what may be registered as a trademark and does not expressly
require that trademarks be verbal or even visual. 6 Still, trade-
mark law does impose some limits on what symbols are eligible
for protection. The two primary limitations are the requirements
of distinctiveness and nonfunctionality.
A. Distinctiveness
Courts distinguish among word trademarks based on how
distinctive the words are; the more distinctive the word, the more
it is entitled to protection. 7 When evaluating the distinctiveness
of a mark, courts generally refer to the framework set forth by
Judge Friendly in Abercrombie & Fitch. Under this system, a
single mark, used by a single manufacturer, can be generic, de-
scriptive, suggestive, or arbitrary. This characterization often
depends on slight differences in the type of product to which the
mark pertains. In Abercrombie & Fitch itself, which involved a
dispute between two clothing and sporting goods manufacturers,
the court applied the hierarchical distinctiveness test and held
that the mark "Safari" was generic with respect to trousers (part
of a "Safari suit"), descriptive with respect to boots (designed to
be worn while on safari), and suggestive with respect to
12 Two Pesos, Inc. v Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S Ct 2753, 2757 (1992) (noting the
"Lanham Act was intended to 'make actionable the deceptive and misleading use of
marks' and 'to protect persons engaged in... commerce against unfair competition'"),
quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v Ives Labs., Inc., 456 US 844, 858 (1982).
See 15 USC § 1051.
' See 15 USC § 1053.
15 See 15 USC § 1125.
16 See 15 USC § 1052.
17 See Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F2d at 9. The Supreme Court has given its blessing
to the Abercrombie & Fitch system of classification. See Two Pesos, 112 S Ct at 2760.
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swimsuits (designed to evoke a romantic association with an
African hunting expedition-even though one rarely wears swim
trunks while hunting elephants)."8
Generic words are not considered distinctive; they are said to
refer to the type of product, rather than to the manufacturer. 9
"Rice," for example, can never be protected as a trademark for
white rice because a manufacturer "cannot deprive competing
manufacturers of the product of the right to call an article by its
name."" Furthermore, an originally distinctive mark may, over
time, come to serve as the name of the product type. If a signifier
becomes generic in this fashion, it loses its trademark protec-
tion.2
Descriptive marks describe an important aspect of the prod-
uct, but not the product itself.' A descriptive mark is not pre-
sumptively distinctive, and without more it may not be protected
as a trademark.' The mark may acquire distinctiveness, howev-
er, if over time purchasers come to associate the mark with a
particular source or manufacturer and distinguish between goods
that possess the mark and those that do not.' This acquired
distinctiveness is referred to as the mark's secondary meaning.
"Rice," for example, would be a descriptive word with respect to
crackers made from rice ("cracker" would be a generic term and
therefore unprotectable). "Rice" would be protectable only if pur-
chasers knew that "Rice" brand rice crackers were made by a
particular, single manufacturer, or if purchasers viewed "Rice"
brand rice crackers as somehow different from other brands, thus
giving "rice" a secondary meaning.
'8 537 F2d at 9-13.
SId at 9.
20 Id.
21 See DuPont Cellophane Co. v Waxed Products Co., 85 F2d 75 (2d Cir 1936) ("cello-
phane" lost trademark protection because the term became generic). On rare occasions, a
manufacturer may reclaim an originally distinctive mark found to have become generic.
For example, after Singer's sewing machine patent expired and the right to produce the
machines had passed to the public, June Manufacturing Company used Singer's mark on
its own machines with the intention of deceiving consumers. The Supreme Court held that
June should be enjoined from using the Singer mark unless it clearly distinguished its
product from Singer's. See Singer Mfg. Co. v June Mfg. Co., 163 US 169 (1896).
See Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F2d at 10.
See id. See also 15 USC § 1052(e).
See Two Pesos, 112 S Ct at 2757-60. Proof that the mark has become distinctive
may be achieved by a showing of "substantially exclusive and continuous use... by the
applicant in commerce for the five years before the date on which the claim of distinctive-
ness is made." 15 USC § 1052(f).
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"Suggestive" and "arbitrary or fanciful" words are considered
distinctive marks and may therefore be protected under the
Lanham Act even without a showing of secondary meaning.' A
suggestive word describes the product in a more abstract way
than does a descriptive word and requires the purchaser to exert
some mental effort to connect the word with the product. "Rice,"
then, would be a descriptive mark with respect to rice paper, but
would be a suggestive mark with respect to kimonos.
Arbitrary and fanciful words are generally afforded full pro-
tection under the Lanham Act. An arbitrary word is a common
word used in a strikingly unconventional manner. "Rice" would
be an arbitrary term if used to identify a brand of bulldozer. A
fanciful word is one invented solely to identify a brand. "Rixrix!"
could be a fanciful trademark for rice.
B. Functionality
Although the Lanham Act does not expressly discuss
nonfunctionality as a requirement for trademark protection,
courts have held that a trademark may not be protected if it is
an essential characteristic of what makes the product do what it
does, or be what it is." A manufacturer cannot, for example,
register a handle as a trademark for his brand of water pitcher.
He could, however, register the distinctive shape of a handle as
his trademark, so long as the distinctive shape does not increase
the handle's functionality.28
Functional features may not be protected under trademark
law, because doing so would defeat the patent law's goals of giv-
ing inventors only a limited monopoly over their inventions and
refusing protection of inventions that are either obvious or
insufficiently innovative.' If functional features could be trade-
marked, then an inventor could perpetually prevent competitors
from using such features on their products even after his patent
expired. Additionally, a manufacturer could preclude the use of a
particular feature even when the feature would never have been
2' See Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F2d at 10-11; Two Pesos, 112 S Ct at 2759.
21 See Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F2d at 10-11; Two Pesos, 112 S Ct at 2759.
27 The Restatement of Torts § 742 (1938), describes a fimctional feature as one that
affects the "purpose, action or performance [of a good], or the facility or economy of pro-
cessing, handling or using" a good.
' See, for example, In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F2d 1332, 1341-43
(CCPA 1982) (spray-bottle design held nonfunctional).
2 See J. Thomas McCarthy, 1 Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 7:26 at 236-37
(Law Co-op, 1984 & Supp 1991).
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patentable in the first place.3" Any competitor may copy an un-
patentable but useful feature: "Our natural inclination to disap-
prove of such conduct must give way to the public policy favoring
competition, even by slavish copying.""1 To preclude competitors
from imitating functional designs or features would deny them
the opportunity to compete effectively. 2
Two types of functionality limit the scope of trademark pro-
tection: utilitarian functionality and aesthetic functionality. Utili-
tarian functionality pertains to the efficiency of design, ease of
use, ease of manufacture, cost of production, and similar aspects
of the product's material utility or quality." A utilitarian func-
tionality argument prevailed in Inwood Labs., Inc. v Ives Labs.,
Inc., where the Supreme Court refused, on procedural grounds, to
hold that the color of a prescription drug should be afforded
Lanham Act protection.' The Court refused to enjoin "generic"
drug manufacturers from copying colors used by the "brand
name" manufacturers. The Court let stand the district court's
finding that color on prescription drugs is functional because
patients mingle their medication and rely on color to distinguish
one pill from another, because color may aid speedy identification
in emergency situations, and because color may help eliminate
the possibility of a pharmacist's confusing one dosage or medica-
tion with another.35
Aesthetic functionality is a much more ambiguous concept. It
relates to design aspects that neither reduce the cost of manufac-
ture nor make the product easier to use, but nevertheless contrib-
ute to the commercial success of the product.5 A heart-shaped
'o See Keene Corp. v Paraflex Industries, Inc., 653 F2d 822, 824 (3d Cir 1981);
Sylvania Electric Products, Inc. v Dura Electric Lamp Co., 247 F2d 730, 732 (3d Cir 1957).
S Keene Corp., 653 F2d at 824.
See Morton-Norwich, 671 F2d at 1339-40.
See McCarthy, 1 Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 7:26 at 238-43 (cited in
note 29).
34 456 US 844 (1982).
' Id at 853. See also Justice White's concurring opinion, which would have reached
the merits of the dispute. Id at 859, 862-63. Commentators have spilled much ink in
discussing the Lanham Act's application to the prescription drug industry. See, for exam-
ple, Note, Issues in the Federal Registration of Flavors as Trademarks for Pharmaceutical
Products, 1993 U Ill L Rev 105 (1993); Joseph P. Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Compe-
tition: What Should Be the Reach of Section 43(a)?, 31 UCLA L Rev 671 (1984); Steven M.
Weinberg, Drug Capsule Color Copying in the Wake of Ives: A Comment on Two Decisions,
72 Trademark Rptr 285 (1982); Iver P. Cooper, Trademark Aspects of Pharmaceutical
Product Design, 70 Trademark Rptr 1 (1980); Paul D. Parnass, Color and Appearance-A
Trademark Issue, 21 Idea 192 (1980).
' See McCarthy, 1 Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 7:26 at 246 (cited in note
29). See also Schwinn Bicycle Co. v Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F2d 1176, 1190 (7th Cir 1989)
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box for Valentine's Day candy, for example, could be seen as
aesthetically functional; if one manufacturer could monopolize
that shape, .he would have a tremendous advantage over his
competitors. For whatever reason, many consumers simply will
not buy Valentine's Day candy unless it is in a heart-shaped
box." A manufacturer of marbles, however, could trademark a
heart-shaped box because few potential purchasers of marbles
would refuse to buy marbles not packaged in a heart-shaped box.
But the term "aesthetic" does not imply that a visually appealing
design may never be protected as a trademark. The Third Cir-
cuit, for example, cautioned against overbroad application of the
doctrine in Keene Corp. v Paraflex Industries, Inc.:
[The doctrine of aesthetic functionality] provides a
disincentive for development of imaginative and attractive
design. The more appealing the design, the less protection it
would receive. As our ambience becomes more mechanized
and banal, it would be unfortunate were we to discourage
use of a spark of originality which could transform an ordi-
nary product into one of grace. The doctrine of aesthetic
functionality need not be construed in such a manner for it
to fulfill its important public policy function of protecting
free competition."5
The Keene Corp. court, however, denied trademark protection to
the design of a light fixture because "part of its function includes
its architectural compatibility with the structure or building on
which it is mounted. Thus, its design configuration, rather than
serving merely as an arbitrary expression of aesthetics, is intri-
cately related to its function." 9
Courts have expressly and implicitly relied on the aesthetic
functionality doctrine when denying trademark protection to
colors.4" The doctrine has not, however, gained universal accep-
(trial court erred in ignoring aesthetic features in functionality determination); Restate-
ment of Torts § 742, comment a (1938).
" See Restatement of Torts § 742 comment a (1938).
8 653 F2d at 825.
'9 Id at 826.
4" See AmBrit, Inc. v Kraft, Inc., 812 F2d 1531, 1548-49 (11th Cir 1986) (implying
reliance on an aesthetic-functionality rationale based on what feelings consumers associ-
ate with the color royal blue); First Brands Corp. v Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F2d 1378, 1381-
83 (9th Cir 1987) (finding "a competitive need" for the color yellow in the retail antifreeze
market and therefore ruling the color yellow functional); Deere & Co. v Farmhand, Inc.,
560 F Supp 85, 95-98 (S D Iowa 1982), aff'd, 721 F2d 1253 (8th Cir 1983) (per curiam)
(finding a competitive need for the color green, since purchasers of farm equipment would
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tance, and was rejected by the Federal Circuit's predecessor, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.4'
C. The Purchaser Confusion Balancing Act
A mark on a product relays a message to the purchaser. The
central question in most trademark cases is whether the mark,
through its message, tells the purchaser something useful and
special, or conversely, gives him no additional information and
perhaps deceives him. If the mark is not distinctive, it conveys no
additional information about the source or quality of the goods.
Additionally, purely functional aspects of a product say nothing
to the purchaser; they merely make the product do what it is
supposed to do. If I buy a Swiss Army knife because it comes
with a can opener, my purchasing decision really is independent
of any message the product's appearance sends to me. But if I
buy a knife with a can opener because I see the Swiss Army cross
on it, I have made my decision on the basis of the message the
product sends to me. Indeed, my total economic costs of purchas-
ing the knife are reduced because I do not need to open the knife
in the store to learn of the enclosed can opener. If, however,
when I get home, I open the knife and find no can opener inside,
I have been cheated.
The manufacturer who misappropriates a trademark de-
frauds the purchaser by inducing him to rely on the reduced
search costs promised by the mark. Indeed, trademark litigation
often turns on the factual question of whether the defendant's
use of a certain symbol poses a likelihood of confusing the typical
purchaser: Does the defendant use a symbol in a manner that a
want all their equipment to match). But see Master Distributors, Inc. v Pako Corp., 986
F2d 219, 221-22 (8th Cir 1993) (noting the limited extent of the Deere & Co. holding); In
re Deere & Co., 7 USPQ2d (BNA) 1401, 1404 (TTAB 1988) (rejecting an aesthetic function-
ality argument and allowing Deere & Co. to register a trademark for farm equipment
where the equipment was green but with yellow wheels).
41 See Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F2d 925, 931 (CCPA 1964). The
Fifth and Sixth Circuits also have rejected the doctrine. See Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v
Cox, 732 F2d 417, 428 (5th Cir 1984); WSM, Inc. v Tennessee Sales Co., 709 F2d 1084,
1087 (6th Cir 1983). The Second and Tenth Circuits have sharply limited the doctrine. See
Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v Godinger Silver Art Co., Inc., 916 F2d 76 (2d Cir 1990);
Brunswick Corp. v Spinit Reel Co., 832 F2d 513, 518-19 (10th Cir 1987). See also McCar-
thy, 1 Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 7:26 at 247 (cited in note 29) ("The notion of
'aesthetic functionality' is an unwarranted and illogical expansion of the functionality
policy."). Significantly, in a recent case, the Ninth Circuit ordered the cancellation of a
"mere color" trademark, but did not do so on functionality grounds and did not use the
case as a vehicle for reaffirming the doctrine of aesthetic functionality. See Qualitex Co. v
Jacobson Products Co., 13 F3d 1297, 1304-05 (9th Cir 1994).
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reasonable purchaser would view as an implicit promise that this
product comes from that source?'
Trademark law must protect those symbols that tell the
purchaser something useful about the source of a product and
must protect only those symbols. As the discussion of function-
ality indicated, protecting too much under the realm of trade-
mark law disserves the public by discouraging beneficial competi-
tion.
II. THE SPLIT OVER "MERE COLOR"
Until 1985, it was well settled among the lower courts that
no single color could ever be distinctive enough to be granted
trademark protection. Color could be protected as a trademark
only to the extent that it was used as part of a pattern of other
colors, words, or symbols.43  Courts' reluctance to grant
trademark protection to "mere color" was in part due to the "color
depletion" rationale, which held that granting trademark protec-
tion to mere color would have anticompetitive effects because the
first producers to enter the market could snap up all the good col-
ors.' Additionally, courts refused to protect patterns of just a
few colors.45
The Federal Circuit broke sharply away from the "color de-
pletion" orthodoxy in 1985 with its decision in In re Owens-Corn-
ing Fiberglas Corp.'s The court noted that Congress intended
the Lanham Act to be read broadly to allow protection of a wide
variety of trademarks: "The principal purpose of the Lanham Act
' See Park 'N Fly v Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 US 189, 198 (1985) (Lanham Act
protects "the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing products"). See also
Pignons S. de Mecanique de Precision v Polaroid Corp., 657 F2d 482, 487 (lst Cir 1981)
(noting the Lanham Act's primary purpose is to prevent purchaser confusion).
4' See, for example, Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F2d 200, 204 n 6 (2d Cir 1979), citing Quabaug Rubber Co. v Fabiano Shoe Co., 567 F2d
154, 161 (1st Cir 1977) ("Although color alone is not capable of becoming a trademark, a
combination of colors together with a distinctive arbitrary design may serve as a trade-
mark.").
" See, for example, Campbell Soup Co. v Armour & Co., 175 F2d 795, 798 (3d Cir
1949) ("If they may thus monopolize red in all of its shades the next manufacturer may
monopolize orange in all its shades and the next yellow in the same way. Obviously, the
list of colors will soon run out .... [Mian cannot acquire a trademark by color
alone .... ").
' See Diamond Match Co. v Saginaw Match Co., 142 F 727, 729 (6th Cir 1906)
(where it is important that the head and tip of a match be different colors to enable users
to distinguish on which tip the match should be struck, manufacturers are not entitled to
a monopoly of any two particular colors).
4 774 F2d 1116 (Fed Cir 1985).
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was the modernization of trademark law, to facilitate commerce
and to protect the consumer .... Under the Lanham Act trade-
mark registration became available to many types of previously
excluded indicia. Change was gradual and evolutionary," but
eventually the Patent and Trademark Office permitted registra-
tion of such varied marks as sounds, candy-bar wrappers, slo-
gans, ornamental labels, and "goods which take the form of the
mark itself."47 The court described Owens-Corning's pink as
"akin to an over-all surface design."' The court also noted that
the evidence Owens-Coming presented on the scope and effects of
its advertising campaign clearly established a secondary meaning
of the color pink because an extraordinarily large number of
homeowners identified pink with Owens-Corning.49
Additionally, the court held that the color depletion theory
should not be used in all circumstances to prohibit the
trademarking of a single color under all circumstances. In deter-
mining whether to trademark a color, courts should consider "the
nature of the goods, how the color is used, the number of colors
or color combinations available, the number of competitors, and
customary marketing practices."50
In dissent, Judge Bissell argued that the majority improperly
ignored longstanding doctrine holding that color may not be pro-
tected as a trademark absent some other design feature. Accord-
ing to him, protecting "mere color" would also have
anticompetitive effects, not because color depletion doctrine so de-
manded, but because Owens-Corning was so successful in its ef-
forts to get purchasers to associate pink with its products. "[Bly
reason of the dominance of Owens-Corning in the field... pink
insulation has become virtually synonymous with home insula-
tion," and many consumers demand that their insulation be
pink.5' To purchasers, "pink" represents insulation in the same
way that "yellow" represents legal pads. Judge Bissell also ar-
gued that courts would face intractable problems in distinguish-
mg one shade of color from another, a difficulty that would out-
". Id at 1119-20 (citations omitted). See also S Rep No 1333, 79th Cong, 2d Sess (May
14, 1946), reprinted in 1946 US Code Cong Serv 1274 (noting some of the Lanham Act's
purposes are "to simplify registration and to make it stronger and more liberal, [and] to
dispense with mere technical prohibitions and arbitrary provisions").
' Owens-Corning, 774 F2d at 1123.
49 Id at 1126-28.
50 Id at 1120.
1 Id at 1130 (Bissell dissenting). This analysis comes very close to finding that pink
is aesthetically functional. See text accompanying notes 36-41.
1994] 1605
The University of Chicago Law Review
weigh any possible benefit of allowing color trademark protection.
Even if protecting color would reduce purchaser confusion slight-
ly, the administrative costs of determining when a color is in fact
confusing would be too great.52
In NutraSweet Co. v Stadt Corp., the Seventh Circuit ex-
pressly rejected the Federal Circuit's reasoning and affirmed tra-
ditional doctrine barring "mere color" trademarks.53 NutraSweet
used a shade of pastel blue on the packaging for the artificial
sweetener it sold to restaurants and sought an injunction barring
its competitors from using a different but "confusingly similar"
shade of blue. The Seventh Circuit criticized the Federal Circuit
for ignoring longstanding doctrine and warned that the Federal
Circuit's approach would inevitably lead to extended and waste-
ful litigation over the degree to which one shade could be distin-
guished from another. The court, noting that the colors at issue
were in fact distinguishable, refused to descend into the
quagmire of determining how distinguishable was distinguishable
enough to ensure that purchasers would not be confused. The
court also criticized the Federal Circuit's concern for the number
of competitors in the market, contending that no court could
predict how many competitors would enter the market in the fu-
ture, or even if any would enter at all.'
The Courts of Appeals remain divided on the question of
color trademarks. The Eighth Circuit adopted the Federal
Circuit's liberal approach, noting the large variety of distinguish-
able shades of colors and pooh-poohing the Seventh Circuit's
concern for shade confusion: "Triers of fact must often answer
close and difficult questions, and the traditional likelihood of
confusion standard should be applied to distinguish similar col-
ors, as it is when similar slogans, symbols, numbers, or words
are compared."55 The Ninth Circuit, after dithering in First
Brands Corp. v Fred Meyer, Inc.," and International Jensen,
Inc. v Metrosound U.S.A., Inc.,5  finally reaffirmed the "mere col-
52 Id at 1131.
917 F2d 1024 (7th Cir 1990).
Id at 1026-28.
Master Distributors, Inc. v Pako Corp., 986 F2d 219, 223 (8th Cir 1993) (citations
omitted).
5 809 F2d 1378, 1382 (9th Cir 1987) (recognizing the continued vitality of the color
depletion theory).
57 4 F3d 819, 823-24 (9th Cir 1993) (questioning the continued vitality of color deple-
tion theory).
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or" rule in Qualitex Co. v Jacobson Prods. Co."8 Academic opin-
ion is also divided on this issue.59
Although the Supreme Court has made no attempt to ad-
dress the issue, the Court's broad understanding of the reach of
Lanham Act protection seems to favor the Federal Circuit's ap-
proach. In Two Pesos, Inc. v Taco Cabana, Inc., the Court noted
the broad scope of the Lanham Act and held that inherently
distinctive trade dress could be protected even without a showing
of secondary meaning."o Trade dress is how a product appears in
the marketplace to potential purchasers."' Examples of trade
dress include a restaurant's interior design,62 a candy wrap-
per," and the shape of a wine bottle."
Most color trademark cases can best be described as trade
dress cases because the manufacturer is most concerned with
securing protection for her product's color as it appears in the
marketplace-where it is typically in combination with other
marketing elements. One could, however, visualize a non-trade
dress color trademark case. A commercial computer bulletin
board, for example, could develop a marketing campaign based
on a slogan such as: "Sick of Big Blue? Tap into the Big Purple
network." The company could follow up on its initial campaign by
hiring skywriters to release clouds of purple smoke over football
stadiums, or purchasing five-second television advertising slots
and broadcasting nothing but purple, or erecting big purple bill-
boards, without any text or graphics on them. Purple in this
situation would be a non-trade dress, color service mark. Al-
though such a case would not fit well under traditional trade
dress doctrine, the Supreme Court has emphatically stated that
the text of the Lanham Act suggests no basis for treating verbal,
" 13 F3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir 1994).
For support of the "mere color" rule, see McCarthy, 1 Trademarks and Unfair
Competition § 7:16 at 42-43 (cited in note 29). For opposition to the rule, see Andrew W.
Coleman, Color as Trademarks: Breaking Down Barriers of the Mere Color Rule, 74 J
Patent & Trademark Office Society 345 (1992); Brian Richard Henry, Right Hat, Wrong
Peg: In Re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. and the Demise of the Mere Color Rule, 76
Trademark Rptr 389 (1986); Charles H. Ellerbrock, Trademark Registration of a Color
Having Secondary Meaning: In Re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, 27 Idea 7
(1986). The business community wants this issue settled one way or the other, and soon.
See Junda Woo, Rulings Clash Over Colors in Trademarks, Wall Street J B1 (Feb 25,
1993).
60 112 S Ct 2753, 2758-61 (1992).
61 See id at 2755 n 1.
62 Id at 2755-56.
In re World's Finest Chocolate, Inc., 474 F2d 1012 (CCPA 1973).
Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F2d 925 (CCPA 1964).
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symbolic, and trade dress trademarks under different
standards."
III. COLOR, THE MARKETPLACE, AND THE LAW
Economists offer a different approach to color trademarks,
and their analysis provides necessary support where judicial ra-
tionales are weak. An economist would argue that the law should
recognize and protect color trademarks when the supply of colors
appropriate for a given product is large, because under these
circumstances purchaser search costs would be reduced with
little efficiency loss resulting from heightened barriers to en-
try." This Section discusses how courts may apply this principle
to real-life situations. An examination of some of the science,
physiology, and psychology behind human perception of color
indicates that the NutraSweet court's concerns about the
distinguishability of colors can in many cases be resolved at low
cost. The benefits gained from reducing purchaser confusion can
often outweigh the difficulties courts may face when determining
if such confusion does in fact exist.
A. Physics and Physiology
Nearly all judicial discussion of the "mere color" rule ignores
the physical and psychological realities of color. Proponents of the
color depletion theory argue that granting trademark protection
to a particular color would have anticompetitive effects because
potential competitors would be denied access to a limited stock of
attractive colors."7 Courts are particularly afraid of limiting ac-
cess to the "primary colors."68 Furthermore, those courts opposed
to Lanham Act protection of "mere color" cite the difficulty of
6 Two Pesos, 112 S Ct at 2760. See also Justice Thomas's concurring opinion, 112 S
Ct at 2766-67 ("Over time, judges have come to conclude that packages or images may be
as arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive as words or symbols, their numbers limited only by
the human imagination.").
' See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law:An Economic Perspec-
tive, 30 J L & Econ 265, 288-89, 297-99 (1987).
6' See, for example, NutraSweet, 917 F2d at 1028.
See, for example, First Brands Corp., 809 F2d at 1382 n 3 (finding that the district
court clearly based its refusal to protect the yellow color of an antifreeze container on the
color depletion theory and on the notion that yellow is a primary color); Campbell Soup
Co. v Armour & Co., 175 F2d 795, 798 (3d Cir 1949), quoting Pacific Coast Condensed
Milk Co. v Frey & Co., 85 Wash 133, 147 P 865, 869 (1915) (noting that there are few
primary colors); Diamond Match Co. v Saginaw Match Co., 142 F 727, 729 (6th Cir 1906)
(same).
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distinguishing one shade of color from another.69 At the same
time, however, proponents of the color depletion theory do not
even discuss the nature of color and of primary color, and what
distinguishes one color from another. An investigation into the
properties of color reveals that the color depletion theory has lit-
tle scientific basis.
Without a scientific understanding of color, courts will find it
difficult to develop a color trademark jurisprudence that will ade-
quately protect both businesses and consumers. Although light
may be described in terms of the wavelength of electromagnetic
energy, and although perceived color corresponds to light's wave-
length, color truly exists only in the human mind.70 What the
mind perceives as color depends on the amount of stimulation
received by receptors in the eye. These receptors are called cones,
and normal humans have three kinds of cones: R, G, and B. R
cones are most stimulated by electromagnetic energy correspond-
ing to the red part of the spectrum, G by the green part, and B
by the blue part.7
A color is composed of three elements: hue, saturation, and
value. What the mind perceives as hue depends on the relative
degree of stimulation of the eye's receptors.72 Hue is what people
normally think of when they think of color. Different hues are
represented on an artist's color wheel. Red and green, for exam-
ple, are different hues. Red and pink, however, are different
variants of the same hue, red. Saturation, or chroma, is the de-
gree of a color's intensity. High saturation colors look bold, while
colors with low saturation look greyish and washed out.73 Value
is the degree of a color's lightness or darkness; the higher the
value, the lighter the color appears.74 These three characteristics
of color are independent of each other. Royal blue, for example,
could describe a range of the hue "blue" with a relatively high
Nutrasweet, 917 F2d at 1027; Qualitex, 13 F3d at 1302.
70 See Robert M. Boynton, Human Color Vision 45-50 (Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1979). For example, not every wavelength of electromagnetic radiation corresponds to a
given color. In addition, sometimes physically different blends of light produce identical
sensations of color in a human observer. Id at 50.
" Id at 122. The eye also contains light receptors called rods, which are very sensi-
tive to light and dark. Rods are not as important for perception as are cones, but are ex-
tremely important for night vision. Id at 113-15.
72 Id at 113.
SId at 30.
' See Kenneth L. Kelly and Deane B. Judd, Color: Universal Language and Dictio-
nary of Names A-1 (US GPO, 1976).
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saturation but a relatively low value. 5 Sky blue could describe a
blue of the same hue, but with a lower saturation and higher
value. 6
The human eye can distinguish between minute differences
of hue, value, or saturation. The National Bureau of Standards
notes that although there are approximately three hundred ver-
bal designations of color, under good lighting conditions the aver-
age person can distinguish among five million shades. " One
verbal color term, then, such as "royal blue," can refer to nearly
twenty thousand distinguishable colors. 8
B. Should the Law Treat "Primary Colors" Differently?
The color depletion theory does not justify a fiat ban on
trademarking "primary colors." First, cases discussing the special
position of "primary colors" never specify exactly what a primary
color is and fail to distinguish between "light primaries" and
"pigment primaries." Second, even if the primary hues were as-
signed a special legal role, courts could nonetheless allow manu-
facturers to trademark narrowly defined ranges of particular
primary hues.
The primary hues of light (the three colors of light that when
added together produce white light) are precise shades of orange-
red, violet-blue, and green.79 The primary pigment hues (the
three precise shades that when present in equal quantities ab-
sorb all visible light, and therefore are said to sum to black) are
magenta red, green-blue, and yellow.8" When a court says that
primary colors are special in some general way, that these partic-
ular shades are somehow more common or more recognizable, it
is not saying much at all, and certainly is not saying enough to
formulate a proper legal rule.81 Courts have been loose in their
definition of "primary color." Various shades of red, yellow, and
blue have been described as primary colors, with absolutely zero
7' Id at 143.
76 Id at 145.
7 Id at A-7.
78 Id.
71 See Louis Cheskin, Color Guide for Marketing Media 7 (MacMlan, 1954).
so Id at 7-9.
81 See id at 21:
It is now clear that the true blue and the commonly recognized red are not primaries,
either in light or in pigment. On the color chart or on a color wheel blue lies between
green-blue (a pigment primary) and violet-blue (a light primary). Red lies between
magenta red (a pigment primary) and orange-red (a light primary).
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discussion of whether the particular shades in question were in
fact true primaries from a scientific standpoint.82
Second, even if the courts accorded the primary hues, proper-
ly defined, special legal significance, a better legal rule would be
to allow a manufacturer to trademark a particular hue within a
certain well-defined and narrow range of value and saturation. At
trial, the finder of fact could determine whether two colors are so
close as to create a likelihood of confusion. For registered marks,
the registrant could submit a sample of the color, along with a
description. If "a high impact, fresh floral fragrance reminiscent
of Plumeria blossoms" describes a scent with sufficient particu-
larity," then surely "a warm, brilliant sky blue reminiscent of a
summer day in the English countryside" adequately describes a
color. Other manufacturers would then still be free to use the
same primary hue at other value and saturation levels. They
could, for example, use "a subtle but majestic blue, reminiscent of
the sky half an hour before a summer thunderstorm," which
probably would have the same saturation level but a lower value.
Alternatively, they could use "an icy blue, reminiscent of a per-
fect day for skiing," which perhaps would have a higher value but
lower saturation. Granting protection in the form of allowing
registration of the color therefore does not necessarily apprecia-
bly reduce the number of colors available to competitors, even if
primary hues-however defined-are particularly popular.
Protecting an unregistered color through an infringement
suit would have even fewer anticompetitive effects than would
registering a color, because such a suit will determine only the
narrow question of whether the defendant's use of color is confus-
ingly similar to that of the plaintiff's, taking into account all
pertinent aspects of the relevant market. In such a case the court
need not worry about preventing all potential competitors, pres-
ent and future, from using a particular color, but instead the
court must only determine if one particular defendant is mar-
keting his goods in a way that misleads purchasers. 4
82 See Campbell Soup Co. v Armour & Co., 175 F2d 795, 798 (3d Cir 1949) (red); First
Brands Corp., 809 F2d at 1382 n 3 (yellow); Diamond Match Co. v Saginaw Match Co.,
142 F 727, 729-30 (6th Cir 1906) (red and blue).
' In re Clarke, 17 USPQ2d (BNA) at 1238. The registrant in Clarke was not required
to submit a sample of the scent. Id at 1240 n 6 ("The era of scratch & sniff has not
reached the Patent and Trademark Office.").
'" Perhaps these competing concerns explain the anomalous result in Qualitex, 13
F3d at 1304-05, in which the Ninth Circuit upheld the plaintiff's award of damages on the
grounds that the defendant intentionally copied the color of plaintiff's product, but the
court at the same time cited the "mere color" rule and ordered cancellation of the
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C. The Technical Feasibility of Producing Diverse Shades
The fear that the range of available colors will be depleted,
then, is an improper basis for refusing to grant Lanham Act
protection to mere color marks. In some circumstances, however,
the color depletion theory may serve as a useful test for deter-
mining whether a particular color mark should receive protec-
tion.
In considering a color trademark," courts should hear testi-
mony about the effective range of colors technically available for
a product. Even if a word trademark is easier to apply to a prod-
uct than is a distinctive color, the party seeking protection of the
color should nonetheless be allowed to show that it would be
technically and economically feasible for a competitor to put a
distinguishable color on a competing product."6
Consider sound marks as an analogy. A television broadcast-
er, for example, could choose any arbitrary arrangement of
sounds to serve as a service mark." Similarly, a manufacturer
could build a sports-car engine that hummed in a distinctive
way." If automobile production technologies significantly limited
the number of possible ways a sports-car engine could hum, the
hum should not receive protection under the Lanham Act, since
plaintiff's registration of the color as a trademark. The court may have wished to protect
this particular plaintiff from a competitor's unfair business practices while fearing future
anticompetitive effects. Viewed this way, the Ninth Circuit seems to be practicing a form
of acoustic separation. The Ninth Circuit's apparent rule of law is, "You can't trademark a
color, but if your competitor copies your distinctive color in a manner that will mislead
unsophisticated purchasers, he will be liable to you in damages for trade-dress infringe-
ment." But such semantic games simply allow courts to shirk their duty to provide clear
rules by which businesspeople may order their affairs. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision
Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv L Rev 625
(1984).
' The concept of a color service mark might seem odd at first, but it should not. In
fact, a striking, unusual color--divorced from any shape, form, or language-might be the
perfect mark for a new, unusual, innovative service. See Jean-Paul Favre and Andr6
November, Color and und et Communication 26 (ABC Verlag, 1979).
8 See Owens-Coming, 774 F2d at 1121 (court considered feasibility of using other
colors in deciding whether use of color pink for fibrous insulation was functional). See also
DAP Products, Inc. v Color Tile Mfg., Inc., 821 F Supp 488, 495 (S D Ohio 1993)
(magistrate's opinion) ("[I]n light of available contemporary technology[, t]here are a
myriad of colors and shades available for products today that were certainly not available
in the past.").
" See note 4.
88 Car manufacturers do seek to install distinct engine sounds in their cars. For ex-
ample, the chief engineer for the Mazda Miata noted: "We were working on the exhaust
sound even before we had engines in test cars .... We believed that the right sound was
very important." See Rich Ceppos, His Task Was Exhausting: Praise for Mazda Miata
Automobile, Car & Driver 23 (Apr 1990).
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allowing trademark protection would limit other manufacturers'
ability to enter the market for sports-car engines. If, however, en-
gines can hum in all sorts of ways, then an unusual hum should
receive protection as a trademark, since it can identify the brand
and distinguish it from competing brands. A purchaser, hearing
the hum, can identify the engine's source without having to lift
the hood of the car and inspect. Allowing other manufacturers to
copy that hum would create the possibility of purchaser confu-
sion.
Some items are tough to color, and certain colors are tough
to mix because certain pigments are chemically incompatible.89
Many colors do not remain true; a manufacturer might find it
difficult to produce a precise shade time and time again, and
therefore might seek to protect a broader range of color.' If,
however, technology allows replication of precise shades on a
given product, courts should be more willing to protect a color as
a trademark because the manufacturer is depleting less of the
available spectrum.
Similarly, if the constraints of mass production make it diffi-
cult for a manufacturer to ensure consistent color on all his prod-
ucts, courts should be less apt to allow the color to be protected
because doing so would "deplete" more of the universe of color.
But if the court determines that technological advances allow
alternative colors to remain open to potential competitors, the
court should allow protection to the broader range of color. Again,
this relates to the purchaser confusion question; if purchasers
identify a range of color with a particular source of a product,
then the broader range-and not merely the specific
shade-should be protected if doing so will not significantly ham-
per competition.
D. Aspects of the Target Market
Courts should also hear evidence on how the color appears in
the marketplace, and if it is feasible-not technically feasible, but
practically feasible, given the market's characteristics-for a
competitor to put a distinguishable color on his product. A liquor
manufacturer, for example, should probably not be permitted to
register a "mere color" trademark or maintain a suit for infringe-
ment if the product is generally sold in smoky, dimly lit bars to
See Cheskin, Color Guide for Marketing Media at 11-12 (cited in note 79).
00 Id at 12-13 (NIA] color, like love, may be either permanent or fugitive.").
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customers whose sensory faculties are dulled: the range of "avail-
able" colors is smaller and the possibility of depletion is greater.
By contrast, a sporting goods manufacturer who primarily sells
his products in broad daylight at portable beachfront stands
should be allowed to protect a "mere color" trademark, because
here the depletion concern is minimal. Again, the finder of fact
could determine, based on the environment in which the product
was sold, whether a reasonable purchaser is likely to confuse the
two goods.
Demographic characteristics of the target market could also
be important in determining what the available range of color is
and therefore whether a particular color should be protectable.
For example, since older people tend to lose some ability to dis-
tinguish one color from another, courts should be less willing to
protect a color mark with respect to, say, prune juice or a similar
product consumed chiefly by older people." Additionally, this
diminution in ability to perceive certain colors might result in
more colors being judged functional-and thus less
protectable-in products marketed to elderly consumers.
Still, courts should keep in mind that purchasers may recog-
nize and respond to extremely fine differences in hue, value, or
saturation. The human eye is far more sensitive than most scien-
tific instruments are to shade differences.92 For example,
"[e]xperienced painters will not permit a batch of paint to run out
in the middle of a wall, even if it is a standard commercial mix,
because the eye will probably see a difference between the two
areas, even though the label on the replacement can reads identi-
cally to that of the original."93
Of course, if the purchaser never gets the chance to make a
side-by-side comparison, she is more likely to be fooled by an
infringer's similar shade. This point, however, does not establish
that shade confusion necessarily supports barring color trade-
marks; instead it suggests that courts should examine the total-
ity of the marketing circumstances when determining if the
Lanham Act should permit registration of a "mere color" mark or
whether a plaintiff shall be allowed to maintain an action for
infringement of such a mark.
91 For a discussion of how aging affects color perception, see Boynton, Human Color
Vision, at 369-71 (cited in note 70).
92 Id at 253.
93 Id at 251.
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E. Psychological or Physiological Functionality
Colors have certain psychological and physiological proper-
ties that courts should consider when addressing the functional-
ity question.' On surf boards, for example, bright colors would
aid the rescue of a surfer who fell off because bright colors
are-for physiological reasons-more likely to catch the eye of a
potential rescuer. Indeed, physiological factors sometimes do
explain a finding of utilitarian functionality. In Edward Weck,
Inc. v IM, Inc., for example, the court found that, in a hospital
setting, the color green is functional because it prevents surgeons
from seeing unsettling afterimages of recently completed sur-
gery.9
5
Psychological rationales can also justify a finding of function-
ality. This is especially the case with food products. For example,
on a can of grapefruit juice certain hues might accentuate aspects
of the juice's taste better than others would. Indeed, given the
importance of color to the marketing of food items, a court should
be less likely to protect color as a trademark in cases involving
food. This point might explain why the NutraSweet court refused
to extend trademark protection to colors. Probably not even the
Federal Circuit would allow Owens-Corning pink to be registered
as a trademark for cotton candy. With food, the line between
utilitarian and aesthetic functionality blurs:
Color plays a substantial, if not ultimate, role in our judg-
ment of the freshness, ripeness, and palatability of food.
Appetite depends on the sense of sight just as much as
on smell. Experiments have been done with people's appe-
tites being stimulated by dishes containing the finest of
delicacies shown under normal light. The substitution of
"The phenomenon of synaesthesias plays an important role in marketing.
Synaesthesias take place whenever exposure to colors produces more than one
stimulation ... when not only the sense of vision is concerned but other senses as well."
Favre and November, Color and und et Communication at 26 (cited in note 85). See also
Frank H. Mahnke and Rudolf H. Mahnke, Color and Light in Man-made Environments
107-14 (Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1987), for a discussion of synaesthetic effects in industri-
al settings.
17 USPQ2d (BNA) 1142, 1143-45 (TTAB 1990). See also American Hospital Supply
Corp. v Fisher Scientific Co., 1988 US Dist LEXIS 11000, *32 (N D Ill) (color orange held
to be functional on medical waste bags); Russell Harrington Cutlery, Inc. v Zivi Hercules,
Inc., 25 USPQ2d (BNA) 1965, 1968 (D Mass 1992) (white held to be functional on knife
handles because it is easier to see whether a white handle has been cleaned properly than
whether a colored handle has been).
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colored light produced nausea. Dark-gray meat, orchid pota-
toes, muddy-violet salads, black peas, and blue bread found
no takers-even though the people knew the food was edi-
ble."
Using similar reasoning, the Second Circuit held in part because
Pepto-Bismol's use of the color pink serves to help soothe
consumers' ailing stomachs, the color cannot be protected as a
trademark.97 Pepto-Bismol pink does not merely help the pur-
chaser identify what he wishes to consume (as does Owens-Corn-
ing fiberglas pink), but also is part of what the consumer con-
sumes; he doesn't just drink the medicine, he drinks the pink.98
Just because the range of colors available to a product is
limited, a court should not necessarily decline to grant the color
trademark status. In the surf board example, even if the color of
the product must have high value and saturation, a wide range of
hues still may be available. Similarly, as in the grapefruit juice
example, if the range of available hues is restricted, value and
saturation may be permitted to vary greatly as long as such vari-
ation does not make the juice less palatable. Although a finding
of functionality implies that all acceptable colors must have cer-
tain characteristics, such a finding does not necessarily imply
that only one or a few colors are functional. In the Pepto-Bismol
case, the consumer might not need to drink pink; any soothing
color might do the trick. Functionality, like much else in the law,
is a matter of degree.
IV. ADDITIONAL EFFICIENCY RATIONALES FOR PROTECTING
DISTINCTIVE COLORS
Assuming that one of the goals of trademark law is to maxi-
mize social wealth, any proposed rule should be justifiable on ef-
ficiency grounds. This Section will discuss efficiency gains that
will likely result from the abolition of the "mere color" rule, over
' Mahnke and Mahnke, Color and Light in Man-Made Environments, 101-02 (cited
in note 94). Note, however, that people's ideas of what colors are palatable change over
time; blue cornbread, for example, is becoming increasingly popular in Southwestern-style
restaurants.
' Norwich Pharmacal Co. v Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F2d 569, 572 (2d Cir 1959). But
see McCarthy, 1 Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 7:21 at 225 (cited in note 29)
("How does anyone know exactly what reaction the color pink produces in people with
upset stomachs? It may make them feel worse, depending upon their subjective reactions
to various colors-which varies widely among different people.").
' Norwich Pharmacal, 271 F2d at 572.
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and above any gains resulting from reduction of purchaser search
costs.
A. Creation of New and Useful Signifiers
Judge Posner and Professor Landes have suggested that
trademark law benefits society by encouraging the development
of language.99 Because manufacturers benefit from developing
new and unusual words to describe their products, they have an
incentive to develop such words. Consumers use the words to
save time and energy when describing the product, and eventual-
ly the most useful words enter the language as generic terms,
ultimately losing their trademark protection and becoming part
of the public domain. Modem language is the richer for having
words like yo-yo, trampoline, brassiere, aspirin, escalator, and ju-
jubes.00
Extending trademark protection to colors would undoubtedly
have the same advantages. Manufacturers would create new and
more striking colors-or at least apply rarely seen colors-in
more (and more unusual) contexts. Many of these colors would
eventually lose their association with a particular product and
enter the aesthetic language as generic, universally recognized
signifiers. It could be argued that in the United States "Sanka
orange" has become a generic color signifying "decaffeinated cof-
fee."110
Another reason to protect color is that it is more difficult to
create and to apply color to a product than it is to create and
apply a word.0 2 This additional cost of application, coupled
with the public good aspects of colorful surroundings, may justify
legal protection of distinctive use of color. Of course, those who
think advertising is more often gaudy and ugly might disagree.
On this view, colorful advertising is an externality, something
the law should discourage. This issue boils down to a question of
taste. We may safely assume, however, that those who wrote the
Lanham Act opposed neither commerce nor advertising.
Landes and Posner, 30 J L & Econ at 271-73 (cited in note 66).
'® McCarthy, 1 Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 12:3 at 533-38 (cited in note
29).
101 See text accompanying notes 122-30.
1 See DAP Products, Inc. v Color Tile Mfg., Inc., 821 F Supp 488, 494 (S D Ohio
1993) (noting that both the plaintiff and defendant incurred additional costs to obtain red
buckets, while both white and black were cheaper).
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B. Color's Surprising Similarity to Other Signifiers
Color marks (and other nonverbal signifiers) are more simi-
lar to word trademarks than may appear upon first examination.
Those who create "new" word trademarks do so by choosing from
the existing set of letters. In a very real sense they create noth-
ing, but merely put existing signs into a previously untried ar-
rangement.' In a similar way, manufacturers may adjust hue,
saturation, and value to create equally new and imaginative
colors.
It may be easier to imagine word creation than to imagine
color creation, but previously unknown colors have, in fact, been
invented by artists."4 One example is International Klein Blue,
a "brilliant, electric ultramarine" created in 1957 by the French
artist Yves Klein."0 5 One critic described the color as having a
unique "vividness, richness and sensuousness. Once seen it's
never forgotten."'
Once a color is used distinctively, it enters the visual lan-
guage. Color can often be a more effective communication tool
than words.0 7 When a manufacturer uses a distinctive color, he
" In addition, because courts protect single-letter trademarks, the creator sometimes
does not even need to arrange anything. "There is nothing, moreover, in decisional law to
preclude a single letter from functioning as a trademark and, in fact, from serving as an
arbitrary and strong mark." Michelin Tire Corp. v General Tire & Rubber Co., 202 USPQ
(BNA) 294, 298 (TTAB 1979) (protecting the letter "X); Singer Mfg. Co. v Singer Uphol-
stering & Sewing Co., 130 F Supp 205, 208 (W D Pa 1955) (protecting the letter "S").
Numbers also may be registered as trademarks. Xerox Corporation, for example, holds a
trademark on the number "4024" with respect to "nonsensitized electrophotographic copy
paper." Trademark Registration No 917,675 (Aug 3, 1971). Oddly, no one has ever ad-
vanced a "letter depletion" theory that would support a blanket rule withholding trade-
mark protection from all such marks. If a manufacturer may appropriate one letter out of
a mere twenty-six, then surely he may appropriate one color out of several hundred-or
several million, depending on how one counts the number of available colors.
104 That such an invented color could be protected by a design patent, under 35 USC
§§ 171-73 (1990), does not preclude its being protected under the Lanham Act. See Owens-
Coming Fiberglas, 774 F2d at 1119-20; Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F2d
925, 929-31 (CCPA 1964). Does an artist who uses a color never before seen create it or
merely discover it? The answer to this question, although perhaps of profound philo-
sophical importance, is irrelevant to the legal analysis. In either case the color was once
unavailable, but through human endeavor now is. It does not matter whether we view the
artist as Zeus, who created fire, or Prometheus, who brought it to Earth.
10 See Grace Glueck, Yves Klein Show at the Guggenheim, NY Times C26 (Nov 19,
1982).
10" James Delingpole, Critic's Choice, Daily Telegraph 20 (Sept 4, 1993), quoting Julia
Payton-Jones.
" One drawback is that the communication is generally unidirectional. The seller
may choose either verbal or nonverbal signifiers. The consumer normally may not. He
must say, "Sanka, please," in response to the question "What type of coffee?" But then, the
consumer could just point to the orange pot.
Protection for Color
makes it easier for purchasers to seek out his products. This
reduction in purchaser search costs is an efficiency gain justifying
legal protection of the color mark.0 8 Additionally, the social
gain simply from creating a previously unknown color may also
be extremely valuable.0 9
C. The Unsophisticated Purchaser
Courts should be most willing to protect nonverbal trade-
marks when the verbal language fails to provide purchasers with
the tools necessary to distinguish one manufacturer's product
from that of another, and when purchasers are unsophisticated,
unable to describe what they are looking for without reference to
color. In these situations the distinctive use of color can have
maximum communicative impact and therefore is most deserving
of trademark protection.
Language is less powerful than lawyers believe. Word trade-
marks are sometimes less effective than nonverbal marks at
identifying the source of goods. Sixteen to twenty-seven million
adult Americans are functionally illiterate, able to read little
more than a street sign. Forty-five million cannot read a newspa-
per. Perhaps as many as eighty-two million cannot understand
Time magazine or compose a letter."0 Many Americans might
be better able to judge whether two nonverbal signifiers are con-
fusingly similar than to judge whether two verbal signifiers are
confusingly similar.
Caselaw tends to support the proposition that color should be
protected when other signifiers fail. In Master Distributors, Inc. v
Pako Corp., the court allowed Lanham Act protection for blue
splicing tape, noting that purchasers frequently would not ask for
this tape by its true name but instead "by asking for 'the blue
tape' or simply for 'blue."""
"0 See Landes and Posner, 30 J L & Econ at 275-80 (cited in note 66), for a formal
analysis of the role of trademark law in reducing consumer search costs.
" For example, an original Yves Klein blue painting sold in 1990 for nearly £800,000.
Joseph Williams, Creative Accountancy, The Times (London) 19 (Oct 23, 1990).
11 Edward E. Gordon, Judith A. Ponticell, and Ronald R. Morgan, Closing the Literacy
Gap in American Business 23 (Quorum, 1991). Protecting nonverbal signifiers will make it
less costly to be illiterate, thereby making the illiterate better off. There is, of course, a
moral hazard problem here: making illiteracy less costly will reduce the incentive for a
rational illiterate person to learn how to read.
11 986 F2d 219, 220 (8th Cir 1993).
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Qualitex Co. v Jacobson Prods. Co., illustrates this point
even more clearly." In that case, the district court allowed a
manufacturer of commercial dry-cleaning press pads to protect
the color "brass # 6587," described as a shade of greenish gold.
The court in part based its holding on the fact that most dry-
cleaning establishments are small family-owned businesses
staffed primarily by recent immigrants, many of whom have little
English-language capability. In this industry color may be the
primary way-if not the only way-to distinguish one product
from another.'
The Ninth Circuit, in a particularly strange opinion, reversed
the district court in part."' The court held that color alone
could not be protected under the Lanham Act, noting other
courts' concern with color depletion and shade confusion, and
accordingly canceled the plaintiff's trademark."' The court pro-
ceeded to find, however, that because the defendant had infringed
the plaintiff's distinctive trade dress, it would affirm both the
plaintiff's money judgment and the order enjoining the defendant
from passing off his product as that of the plaintiff."'
Significantly, in upholding the trade-dress infringement
claim, the Ninth Circuit noted that the defendant's use of the
plaintiff's distinctive color would likely deceive purchasers: "The
degree of care likely to be exercised by the consumer also sup-
ported a finding of likelihood of confusion. Qualitex presented
112 21 USPQ2d (BNA) 1457 (C D Cal 1991), rev'd, 13 F3d 1297 (9th Cir 1994).
-s See id at 1457-58. See also DAP Products, Inc. v Color Tile Mfg., Inc., 821 F Supp
488, 494 (S D Ohio 1993), citing Owens-Corning Fiberglas, 774 F2d 116. The court in DAP
preliminarily enjoined the defendant manufacturer of a tile adhesive-Type I mas-
tic"-from selling its product in red buckets. The plaintiff argued that the color red was
its distinctive trade dress. The court agreed, and noted: "The likely degree of purchaser
care is low. Although the contractors who use Type I mastic are sophisticated with respect
to the skills required for laying tile, they rely on the distributors who sell them mastic to
suggest what product to use." 821 F Supp at 493. The defendant also apparently copied
the plaintiff's red in an attempt to intentionally pass off his goods as that of the plaintiff.
Id.
114 Qualitex, 13 F3d at 1305.
m Id at 1302-05.
16 Id at 1305. The Ninth Circuit's opinion is also troubling from the standpoint of
comity. Although under 15 USC § 1119 courts outside the Federal Circuit have concurrent
jurisdiction to cancel a trademark for any reason that would have precluded initial regis-
tration (provided that the mark had not become incontestable under § 1119(B)), applica-
tion of the "mere color" rule could not have precluded initial registration. The Patent and
Trademark Office, where initial registration must occur, is under the jurisdiction of the
Federal Circuit, where Owens-Corning Fiberglas is the law. Arguably, the Qualitex panel
showed a surprising lack of respect for "a co-equal member of a system of thirteen appel-
late courts arranged in a single tier." In re Roberts, 846 F2d 1360, 1362 (Fed Cir 1988).
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evidence that many purchasers do not speak or read English
well."117
Courts sometimes have looked to purchasers' relative degree
of knowledge when deciding whether a mark should be protected.
Lanham Act protection has been denied when the court viewed
purchasers as especially sophisticated."' Similarly, where dif-
ferent groups of purchasers possessed different amounts of
knowledge about the product in question, courts have tailored the
amount of Lanham Act protection to suit the disparity in sophis-
tication. In Bayer Co., Inc. v United Drug Co., for example, the
court held that "aspirin" was a generic term with respect to lay
purchasers, but not with respect to pharmacists and physi-
cians." '9 Professionals knew that "aspirin" meant Bayer Co.'s
particular brand of acetyl salicylic acid; lay people did not, nor
had they any need or desire to know. °
V. APPLICATION OF DISTINCTIVENESS DOCTRINE TO
NONTRADITIONAL SIGNIFIERS
The distinctiveness doctrine, as originally set forth in
Abercrombie & Fitch, serves as a useful method of ordering the
various concerns and factors discussed above. Like words, colors
can be classified as generic, descriptive, suggestive, or arbitrary.
Application of the Abercrombie & Fitch test may avoid some of
the difficulties the functionality analysis poses, particularly the
proper scope of the aesthetic functionality doctrine.'2 '
A. Generic Colors
A generic color would be one that is so common in a particu-
lar context that it serves to identify the product in only a general
sense. A generic signifier identifies not the particular product
11 Qualitex, 13 F3d at 1305.
" See, for example, Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v Polaroid Corp., 657
F2d at 482, 489 (1st Cir 1981) ("Those most likely to buy an expensive, sophisticated cam-
era in a specialty camera store are also least likely to be confused by any similarities in
Polaroid's and Pignons' marks.").
"' 272 F 505 (S D NY 1921).
See id at 510-14. See also Chas. Pfizer & Co. v Generic Formulae, Inc., 275 F Supp
421, 423 (E D NY 1967) ("Terramycin" challenged; held not generic because purchasers
were medical professionals who associated name with source).
1 McCarthy suggests that the functionality question in the drug-coloring cases can be
avoided by simply determining whether the color identifies the type of drug or whether
the color identifies the particular manufacturer. See McCarthy, 1 Trademarks and Unfair
Competition § 7:21 at 226 (cited in note 29). See also text accompanying notes 33-35.
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signified, but the class into which the signified product falls. Con-
sider a truck painted fire-engine red. The color red indicates only
that the truck is a firefighting vehicle (if it is, in fact, such a
vehicle); the color does not tell us who made the truck. Nor,
strictly speaking, is fire-engine red a functional color. Other col-
ors are, in fact, better than fire-engine red for emergency vehi-
cles, in terms of immediate visibility.
122
Whether a color is generic depends to a large degree on prior
product marketing and on accidents of culture. Decaffeinated cof-
fee, for example, is associated with the color orange ("Sanka
orange") in many parts of the United States, but is associated
with red in Europe.'
Just as verbal trademarks can become generic, and therefore
lose their trademark protection, so too can color trademarks, "no
matter how much money and effort the user [or creator] of a
generic term has poured into promoting the sale of its merchan-
dise and what success it has achieved in securing public identifi-
cation."'24 In American Hospital Supply v Fisher Scientific Co.,
the plaintiff began selling orange biohazard bags at a time when
all other manufacturers made clear bags. 5 The plaintiff also
introduced a "Think Orange!" marketing campaign to create
interest in his new and "arbitrarily"-colored product.126 Over
time, however, orange became universally recognized within the
medical profession as identifying receptacles for biohazardous
medical waste. When the plaintiff sued a competitor for infringe-
ment approximately fifteen years after the bags were first intro-
duced, the court refused to allow the claim, because orange, even
if once an arbitrary choice of color, had come to symbolize the
type and function of the product on which the color appeared:
" Robert Pierre, Fire Engine Red-or Maybe Yellow, or Even Black, Wash Post M1
(Apr 29, 1993), quoting Peter A. Piringer, spokesperson for Prince George's Fire Depart-
ment. See also Southamstar Network, Look! A Real Red Fire Truck, Toronto Star A5 (Aug
6, 1992), quoting Windsor Fire Department Chief Earl Turpin-Carroll ("Meanwhile, warn-
ing-device technology 'has advanced to the point where the color of the vehicle is really
insignificant. Very bluntly, if you can't see a vehicle with all these lights and warning
devices, then you'd have to be blind.'"). If the trend toward yellow fire engines continues,
then perhaps in ten or twenty years most people will consider yellow to be the generic fire
truck color. The term "fire-engine yellow" already conjures up a certain image in those
communities with yellow emergency vehicles. See David Knorr and Doug Fast, Local
Courier Hopes to Tap Statewide Network, Grand Rapids Bus J T-3 (June 15, 1987).
12 See Favre and November, Color and und et Communication at 158 (cited in note
85).
"2 Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F2d at 9.
125 1988 US Dist LEXIS 11000, *4-5 (N D Ill).
126 Id.
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"Although it may have at one time been at least arguable that
AHSC [the plaintiff] had a trademark interest in its orange bags,
it is clear that by the time this lawsuit was filed, orange was
definitely associated with the functionality of the bag [by symbol-
izing biohazard].127
Although the court used the rhetoric of functionality, the
facts of the case may more appropriately be viewed through the
lens of Abercrombie & Fitch. Orange on the biohazard bag is
functional in the same way that all generic marks are functional;
it "refers, or has come to be understood as referring, to the genus
of which the particular product is a species."" s
Judge Bissell, dissenting in Owens-Corning Fiberglas, may
have been trying to make a genericization argument in noting
that some consumers would not buy fiberglass insulation unless
it was pink. 9 The implied argument is that pink has become
so synonymous with residential fiberglass insulation that it no
longer identifies that a particular piece of insulation comes from
a particular source (Owens-Corning), but simply that the insula-
tion is made out of fiberglass and designed for home use.30
B. Descriptive Colors
If not generic, a color may describe one important aspect of
the product.' This function of color is especially important in
food products. Brown shades, for example, often signify a choco-
late flavor; green and yellow shades may signify a citrus fla-
vor. 3 2 The color of a food product may also signal some of its
other vital aspects. In AmBrit v Kraft, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit
refused to uphold an injunction barring use of royal blue on the
' Id at *36. See also Norwich Pharmacal Co. v Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F2d 569, 572
(2d Cir 1959).
12 Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F2d at 9.
774 F2d at 1130 (Bissell dissenting).
o Pink insulations genericization may be upon us. A Commonwealth Edison bro-
chure discussing how homeowners can reduce their utility bills shows a man installing
pink insulation. The brochure does not identify Owens-Corning, nor does it suggest that
Owens-Corning makes the best insulation, but implies that insulation is naturally pink.
Commonwealth Edison, This Winter Warm Your World More Efficiently (1993) (on file
with U Chi L Rev). See also Deere & Co. v Farmhand, 560 F Supp 85, 95-98 (S D Iowa
1982), implying that if farm equipment is not green, it is not really farm equipment.
..1 Remember, too, that even if generic in one context, a color might not be generic in
another. "A term may thus be generic in one market and descriptive or suggestive or
fanciful in another." Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F2d at 10.
' See Favre and November, Color and und et Communication at 27-30 (cited in note
85).
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packaging for a chocolate-covered ice cream bar. 3' In this case,
royal blue functioned as a descriptive mark, not a generic mark,
since the color does not signify "ice cream," but rather "cool and
pleasant": "Royal blue is a 'cool color'; it is suggestive of coldness
and used by a multitude of ice cream and frozen dessert produc-
ers.- 4
The court refused to state categorically that royal blue could
never be protected, but instead held that any order enjoining use
of the color "must be tailored to achieve the goal of protecting the
consuming public from confusion."' By finding that a manufac-
turer could prevent a competitor's use of a descriptive color to the
degree necessary to prevent confusion in the minds of purchasers,
the court implied that existence of secondary meaning would be
one factor to be weighed in determining the likelihood of purchas-
er confusion.
AmBrit illustrates the difficulty of drawing a line between
generic and descriptive signifiers--especially regarding nonverbal
marks. Nevertheless, the line can (and should) be drawn pursu-
ant to the Abercrombie & Fitch categorization. Because ice cream
is not always (or nearly always) signified by blue, blue is a de-
scriptive, rather than a generic mark.
C. Arbitrary, Fanciful, and Suggestive Colors
Arbitrary and fanciful color marks are easier to define. A
fanciful color is a created color, one that would be wholly unfa-
miliar to the average purchaser, at least prior to its application
to the intended product. Qualitex's greenish gold "brass # 6587"
is a good example of a fanciful color. An arbitrary color is one
that, although familiar, is unfamiliar and unexpected in the
particular setting. Owens-Corning Fiberglas's cotton-candy pink,
as applied to insulation, should be seen as arbitiarily chosen,
since cotton candy has little, if anything, to do with insulation.
What, then, would be suggestive use of color? Perhaps a
suggestive color would be one familiar in one setting, but used in
a different, but related setting. The color would be used not to
describe an aspect of the product, but to create an association in
the mind of the purchaser between the product and another item.
If a Dalmatian breeder, for example, were to use fire-engine red
' 812 F2d 1531 (11th Cir 1986).
'3 Id at 1548.
135 Id.
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in her promotional materials, the color would not describe what
her dogs were like, or what they would do. The color would, how-
ever, cause potential purchasers to make an intuitive leap: both
this color and these dogs are commonly associated with fire
trucks. The color choice is neither entirely arbitrary nor entirely
descriptive, but the choice is distinctive enough such that it
should be entitled to protection under the Lanham Act. Perhaps
similar suggestive use of color would be a travel agency's adopt-
ing a "sunshine yellow," an exam preparation course's adopting
an "operating-room green," or a messenger service's painting its
delivery trucks an atrocious lime yellow. 8
CONCLUSION
This Comment has advanced an argument for the equal
protection of colors in the trademark context. The text of the
Lanham Act admits of no formalistic restrictions-such as the
"mere color" rule-on the range of symbols that warrant trade-
mark protection. Furthermore, humans' ability to recognize and
distinguish an immense number of colors should put the color
depletion theory to rest. Finally, protection of "mere color" is
often necessary to guard against purchaser confusion, as in the
Owens-Corning or Qualitex context. Because nonverbal signifiers
are effective and sometimes necessary tools of communication,
the law should prevent their misuse just as it prevents the mis-
use of verbal signifiers. To evaluate whether a given color should
receive trademark protection, courts should use the Abercrombie
& Fitch distinctiveness test. The test can also inform the proper
scope of such protection.
Although this Comment has primarily focused on the short-
comings of the "mere color" rule, the same analysis may be ap-
plied to anachronistic arguments against granting Lanham Act
protection to other nonverbal signifiers. In all cases, the test
should be whether granting trademark protection in a given
circumstance would appreciably diminish the number of signifiers
available to those competitors who wish to use the same type of
mark, whether color, sound, scent, texture, or something else.
Consider again In re Clarke and the Plumeria-scented em-
broidery yarn. A court might ask the following questions in such
1" See Knorr and Fast, Grand Rapids Bus J at T-3 (cited in note 122) ("Image is
important to Metro Courier. The company's fleet of splashy, fire-engine yellow delivery
vehicles screams for attention.'). ,
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a case: Is the sweet fragrance of rose available to competitors, or
will nothing but Plumeria suffice? Can the reasonable nose dis-
tinguish between Plumeria and chrysanthemum? Has Plumeria
become so closely connected with embroidery yarn in the minds
of consumers that they ask the clerk at the sewing supply store
for "Plumeria yarn," when they mean to say "embroidery yarn?"
Business understands how rich is the world of symbols. A
court should not refuse to apply rules of law to nonverbal sym-
bols simply because the court is used to applying those rules to
words. Treating color and words equally under the Lanham Act
does more than bring doctrinal consistency to the law; equal
protection of color means equal protection of those consumers
who use color as a map to guide them through the confusion of
the modern market.
